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On April 1, 1967, a bibliographic note dealing with van Heijenoort’s Source Book, in 
the Library Journal, ended with the following words: “this book will long remain a 
standard work, essential to the study of symbolic logic”. This was obviously an 
overstatement, but easy to correct by inserting three words – From Frege to Gödel has 
been and remains an essential tool in the study of the history of mathematical logic, and 
even more, for the history and philosophy of logic and foundational research. As Quine 
said: 
 
[Van Heijenoort] made a contribution to mathematical logic that was second only to what Alonzo 
Church had contributed in molding the Journal of Symbolic Logic itself. … For us it was a boon 
just to have these papers brought together, to have xeroxes in our hands of the original German. 
But then, he did these painstaking translations and painstaking commentaries … a collaborative 
job, but very largely Van’s own work.1 
 
Thus, it should not come as a surprise that this source book is reissued, after 35 years! 
There are many reasons to welcome the new paperback edition, not least the low price, 
making it accesible to interested students and to libraries throughout the world. 
 
I believe every single person who cares about the topics mentioned above does know 
and value highly van Heijenoort’s achievement. The book not only collected and made 
available to the English-speaking public an impressively wide range of key works, in 
translations of very high quality. From Frege to Gödel contributed to establishing 
higher standards for editorial work in collections on logic and mathematics, as 
witnessed e.g. by the Collected Works of Kurt Gödel, explicitly modeled upon its 
example.2 Particularly noticeable is the quality of the editorial notes that introduce each 
paper, always clear, deep, and yet concise. These were written by leading logicians and 
philosophers like Quine, H. Wang, Dreben, and Ch. Parsons, besides the editor himself.  
                                                
1 Quoted in [2], 281. 
2 [3], vol. I, p. iv (preface). 
 
The person responsible for producing this huge, admirable work was a professor of 
philosophy at Brandeis University. There was more than met the eye behind his modest 
appearance, because Jean van Heijenoort (1912–1986) had been intensely involved not 
only in logic, but also – to speak with his biographer – in politics and love.3 For seven 
years he was personal secretary and bodyguard to Leon Trotsky, following him from 
France to Mexico through Turkey. In 1939 van Heijenoort settled in the USA, and after 
Trotsky’s assassination and the war he went back to his first love, mathematics, doing 
graduate studies and becoming especially interested in mathematical logic. Love came 
in again at the time of his death, shot in the head by his fifth wife, near Cuernavaca in 
Mexico, where she was from.  
 
Van Heijenoort had strong ties to the influential school of logicians-philosophers at 
Harvard University. It was through them that he was appointed editor of the Source 
Book, they assisted him in its production, and it is a safe assumption that they 
influenced heavily his conception of logic and his selection of material. The plan to 
publish a logic anthology in the Harvard series Source Books in the History of Science 
began with Quine and Dreben in 1959. Dreben happened to know van Heijenoort and 
was aware of his deep interest in the development of logic. By then, van Heijenoort had 
independently come to think about editing a collection of seminal logic papers, and his 
passion for exactitude and knowledge of languages were obvious extra bonuses. After 
meeting Quine and Harvard University Press, still in 1959, he was recruited as editor. 
 
Obviously any selection must have its biases, and also its history. Let us examine them 
in turn, beginning with a few words on the figures just mentioned. There is little need to 
introduce W. V. O. Quine (1908–2000), the extremely influential analytical philosopher 
who began his career working with Whitehead and learning from Carnap. Quine’s 
initial work was in mathematical logic, developing two original systems that offered an 
alternative to Russell’s theory of types (and therefore to set theory), and later 
championing first-order logic as “the one” system of elementary logic.4 He was the 
senior man in van Heijenoort’s advisory board. Burton Dreben (1927–1999) is well 
                                                
3 See the delightful biography by A. Feferman [2]. 
4 See [4], which analyzes Quine’s path from logicism to first-order logic. 
known for Quineans, if only because his name is present in the acknowledgements of 
almost all of Quine’s books and papers. A member of the Society of Fellows at Harvard 
in 1952–1955 (as Quine was in the 1930s), he taught at the University thereafter. He 
wrote little, being mainly interested in proof theory and very especially in the work of 
the French logician Herbrand. But Dreben kept a deep interest in the history of 
foundations, logic, and analytical philosophy, being quite influential in these three fields 
indirectly, through personal contacts. There are indications that he may have been very 
intensely involved in the Source Book project. Dreben not only enlisted van Heijenoort, 
but he collaborated closely in making the selections and polishing translations and 
introductions.5 
 
Van Heijenoort’s preface made it clear that the Source Book was targeted at three main 
foci, one being modern symbolic logic, the other, two fields which “emerged on the 
borders of logic, mathematics and philosophy”, namely set theory and foundations of 
mathematics.6 In this triangle, logic formed the longer side, and it conditioned the 
dimensions and aspect of the remaining two. Van Heijenoort’s selection highlighted 
those aspects of foundations and set theory which are intimately linked with formal 
logic, while it clearly downplayed mathematical and philosophical aspects. In the case 
of set theory, the papers included deal only with basic principles and the main axioms 
systems, while properly set-theoretical developments are conspicuously absent. This 
one-sided approach was a sensible one, given limitations of space and the main focus of 
the volume. With that feature in mind, one can easily understand some differences 
between the book under review and the more recent anthologies From Kant to Hilbert 
(1996) and From Brouwer to Hilbert (1998).7 
 
                                                
5 G. Hellman reminisces that, while lecturing, van Heijenoort once referred to the Source Book as a joint 
project with Dreben (personal communication). According to W. Goldfarb (personal communication), 
Dreben’s files contain typescript copies of most of the translations, some in several versions. Goldfarb 
seems to believe that Dreben was an uncredited co-editor (for the straight reason that he preferred to 
remain in the dark, free from the drudgery of editing). 
6 P. vi; notice the very Quinean characterization of set theory. 
7 Ewald, ed. [1]; Mancosu, ed. [10]. The titles make it clear that the souce book under review has played 
an exemplary role. 
The original plan was two volumes, the first to span the period from Frege’s 
Begriffsschrift to Gödel’s celebrated paper, the second from thence “to the present”.8 
Van Heijenoort optimistically thought that the editorial work would be done in six 
months, but he ended up working “terribly hard, under heavy pressure, for seven 
years”.9 He enlistened three collaborators for the task of translating, including Stefan 
Bauer-Mengelberg, who translated 28 out of the total of 46 papers, working on them 
“almost full time” for six years. The care with which they discussed any imaginable 
detail in the translations, dug up additional sources, and analyzed them all to produce 
high-quality introductions and explanatory footnotes – this was the reason for the heavy 
pressure. The outcome was the impressive first volume, but the projected second never 
came into being. 
 
To some extent, the very success of From Frege to Gödel has been the source of 
criticism directed against it. Van Heijenoort’s volume never intended to represent the 
complex historical development of logic from 1879 to 1931. “Encyclopedic 
completeness” was precluded if only because the “main constraint” was that the 
outcome had to be a single volume (p. vi). Yet it was so representative of this history, 
that many of us have wondered why the book excludes some chapters.10 It must be 
acknowledged that such a criticism is unfair, but at the same time one must warn 
readers of this anthology that, if they are looking for a complete picture of the historical 
emergence of mathematical logic, they must complement From Frege to Gödel with 
other anthologies, original treatises, textbooks, and secondary sources.11  
 
One obvious bias, that can only be expected in such an anthology, is that the vista 
displayed before us is clearly whiggish. This could only be a selection of successes, 
excluding programmatic work, dead ends, and influential confusions.12 It may be for 
                                                
8 See van Heijenoort’s letters to Gödel in the latter’s [3], vol. IV (forthcoming), and the introduction by 
Goldfarb (who kindly made it available to me). 
9 Quoted in [2], 275. See also 274–282. 
10 See the reviews by Mostowski [14] and above all by Moore in this journal [11]. 
11 Among the latter, see Goldfarb [6] and Moore [12] & [13]. For complements, Peckhaus [15] and 
Grattan-Guinness [7]. 
12 A relevant example of the last category is Wittgenstein’s famous Tractatus, whose conception of logic 
is remote from modern mathematical logic. 
these reasons that important authors like Frank Ramsey and Leon Chwistek are absent 
(both contributed very much to simplifying type theory). Also absent are all members of 
the very important Polish school in logic, counting Sierpinski, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, 
Lindenbaum and others among its members, and Hermann Weyl’s seminal work in 
predicative foundations (Das Kontinuum, 1918). The reason for this last omission is 
likely to be that the interest of predicative approaches to foundations was lost of sight 
for many years, and that the editors ignored the historical significance of Weyl’s work.13  
 
A very important source for probing the state of development of logic, both in its main 
body and, particularly, in the changing images that researchers project of the enterprise, 
can be found in comprehensive treatises and textbooks. Three key examples, which 
complement van Heijenoort’s source book informatively, are: Schröder’s Vorlesungen 
über die Algebra der Logik (3 vols., 1890–95), Whitehead & Russell’s Principia 
Mathematica (3 vols., 1910–13), and Hilbert & Ackermann’s Grundzüge der 
theoretischen Logik (1928). In spite of the legendary stature of Principia Mathematica, 
only Hilbert & Ackermann’s Grundzüge can be regarded as the first modern 
presentation of mathematical logic, for only here one finds a stern formal approach to 
logical systems plus the all-important focus on metatheoretical questions. 
 
At the time of Ernst Schröder’s lectures, most of mathematical logic was in the 
algebraic tradition of Boole and Peirce, but this is absent from the Source Book. A 
conspicuous characteristic of logical systems around that time is that they routinely 
include set theory as a core part of elementary logic. This would change radically with 
the discovery of the paradoxes. Contemporaneous with Schröder were the forward-
looking contributions of Frege and Peano. Frege introduced the very idea of a formal 
system, and many years later Gödel would rightly emphasize that Whitehead & 
Russell’s treatment of their system represents “a considerable step backwards as 
compared with Frege” ([3], vol. II, 120). Note that Frege’s key works appeared 30 and 
20 years before Principia Mathematica! 
 
Nevertheless, Principia marked an epoch in the development of logical theory and left 
strong traces in many authors. It was an impresively detailed treatise, which developed 
                                                
13 See the reviewer’s [5], chapter X. 
much of mathematics in the symbolic language of logic, starting with a plausible 
solution to the paradoxes that for some time seemed sufficient to rescue the logicist 
project. During the 1920s, Russell’s type theory was generally regarded as the “natural” 
system of logic.14 But neither Russell nor Frege encouraged the metatheoretical study of 
logical systems, a fact reflected upon by van Heijenoort in a famous short paper [8]. 
Interest in metalogic came from the algebraists in Schröder’s tradition (Löwenheim in 
particular, whose work the Source Book did much to call attention to) and from the 
Hilbert tradition in axiomatics. All of these crucial threads were tied and further 
developed in the work of Hilbert and his school during the 1920s, without which the 
decisive contributions of Gödel, Tarski and Turing would have been impossible. 
 
To the list of absences above, we may add that the work of Hilbert’s main collaborator 
Paul Bernays is underrepresented, probably because his original papers of the 1920s are 
too philosophical. And one further omission appears hard to explain, even taking into 
account the already mentioned bias in the treatment of set theory: Zermelo’s paper 
‘Über Grenzzahlen und Mengenbereiche’.15 This presents today’s ZF system, including 
the Axiom of Foundation, and offers an extremely interesting study of the cumulative 
hierarchy, inspired in earlier work by von Neumann. We might try to explain its 
omission by the antagonism between Zermelo’s platonistic attitude toward the higher 
infinite, and the anti-realist leanings of both Quine and Dreben. That led Zermelo to 
offer a second-order axiomatization of ZF, which again conflicted with the opinion of 
Quine and Dreben that first-order is the only logic worthy of this name. (However, the 
true reason might have been simply that Zermelo’s paper, in the Polish journal 
Fundamenta Mathematicae, escaped the attention of van Heijenoort and collaborators.) 
 
From Frege to Gödel deals with the period 1879–1931. Today we might prefer a 
broader delimination of the formative period of mathematical logic, say, from 1847 
(Boole’s Mathematical analysis of logic) to 1936. Van Heijenoort justified his exclusion 
of Boole and the whole trend of the algebra of logic saying that it was important 
developments, but not “a great epoch”. And we may concede that, faced with the 
                                                
14 See [5], chapter X. 
15 Fundamenta Mathematicae 16 (1930), 29–47. See the translation in Ewald [1] and the introductory 
comments by M. Hallett. 
necessity to cut somewhere, it is not bad to start with Frege’s Begriffsschrift, which in 
retrospect emerges as impresively clear and precise, truly epoch-making. Of course, this 
decision leads to historical injustice in case readers are misled into thinking that the 
contributions of authors like Boole, De Morgan, Peirce and Schröder were not very 
relevant. 
 
As regards the final date, one might prefer to stretch the interval so as to include 
seminal papers in formal semantics by Tarski and the crucial contributions of 1936, by 
Turing and Church, on computability and the Entscheidungsproblem. Again, one might 
justify van Heijenoort’s choice by pointing to the large extra space that the inclusion of 
such papers would call for. Moreover, there was the initial idea of a second volume that 
would probably have covered all of this. And, as regards Alfred Tarski, – probably the 
name whose omission is most striking, being the founder of the Berkeley school, 
usually regarded as second only to Gödel among 20th century logicians – it is also true 
that the well-known collection Logic, semantics, metamathematics was available since 
1956. 
 
But I suspect that both the exclusion of Tarski and the decision to begin with Frege 
were related to the conception of logic emanating from Harvard. The viewpoint behind 
van Heijenoort’s selection is, quite clearly, a strictly formal one, by which I mean one 
that is focused on a syntactic presentation and investigation of classical logic. By 
beginning with Frege and closing with Gödel’s investigations in proof theory, that 
conception was enhanced. (The role of Frege as a founding figure had been repeatedly 
emphasized by both Russell and Quine, and thus to start with him was very much in line 
with Harvard views.) If it is true that Dreben was intensely involved in the project, one 
would have even more reason to expect a bias toward the syntactic approach to logic. 
Those who knew him report that he disliked Tarskian set-theoretic semantics and model 
theory. In general, he rejected all kinds of speculative trends16 – and model theory, by 
depending on the strong “philosophical” assumptions of set theory, was in his eyes a 
speculative, risky tendency within mathematical logic. This again was in line with 
                                                
16 Although very interested in the history of analytical philosophy, Dreben is reported to have frequently 
said that all philosophy is nonsense, “garbage,” although “the history of garbage – that’s sholarship!” 
(personal communications, G. Hellman and A. Kanamori). 
Quine’s views concerning logical matters. (Needless to say, Dreben’s hand led to 
interesting additions too, for instance the extremely adequate inclusion of a good 
number of Skolem’s papers.) 
 
Another feature that is strongly in line with the Harvard perspective, as represented by 
Quine, is the strong thesis that “there are no two logics” (p. vii), reinforced in From 
Frege to Gödel by the exclusion of alternative logics, modal logic, and the like. It may 
be surprising to find such a forceful statement in a book that gives much space to 
intuitionism, but this becomes less so when one realizes that van Heijenoort did not 
include contributions like Heyting’s 1930 formalization of intuitionistic logic.17 
 
It is interesting to reflect on the fact that, even though he was guided by a stern, purely 
formal, and seemingly ahistoric conception of logic, van Heijenoort’s selection still 
bears the mark of historical developments. The decision to include papers in set theory 
and foundations could only be justified historically, in terms of the great contribution 
those fields made to the reform and delimitation of mathematical logic, as well as to its 
philosophy. For a long time, from Frege and Dedekind to Carnap, set theory was 
conceived to be merely a part of elementary logic, and the evolution of modern logic 
was intimately entangled with debates on the principles of set theory. Subsequently, in 
the 1920s, most of the novelties introduced into logical theory and the conception of 
logic itself were closely linked with the foundational debate. I believe it is for these 
reasons that an anthology of logic in the first third of the 20th century was felt to require 
inclusion of material in set theory and the foundations of mathematics.18 
 
As we see, an analysis of the contents and origins of From Frege to Gödel offers quite 
an interesting overview of important chapters in the history of logic during the 20th 
century. Philosophically, this would appear as an important instantiation of a far-
reaching general idea: that historical factors, the historical situation (including its 
immediate or even its remote past), are present whenever we offer an evaluation in any 
subject matter, however abstract and universal it may seem. This principle had already 
                                                
17 For this, see Mancosu [10]. 
18 This way of presenting the matter had already appeared in S. C. Kleene’s famous Introduction to 
Metamathematics [9], which may well have served as a model for van Heijenoort. 
been established for scientific methodology, and it is instructive to find it confirmed in 
the very abstract realm of logic itself. 
 
But if we come down to more practical matters, one thing can be regarded as certain. 
The new paperback edition of van Heijenoort’s famous source book must be welcome 
by all those who have an active interest in the history of mathematical logic and the 
foundations of mathematics. Which, of course, includes anybody who is truly interested 
in the history of 20th century mathematics. 
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